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Swedish soccer league. Swedish stadiums introduced surveillance cameras at different points 
in time during the years 2000 and 2001. I exploit the exogenous variation that occurred due to 
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regarding endogeneity, simultaneous policy interventions and displacement effects. 
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Surveillance cameras have become a popular method in many countries in the attempts
to combat crime. Only in the United Kingdom, estimates show that over four million
cameras have been installed (The Associated Press 2007). While the cameras may
reduce crime, this could come at large costs, both in terms of management and, in
particular, in intrusion upon privacy. The American fourth amendment, for example,
which opponents to surveillance cameras often call upon, states that “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e¤ects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated...”.
To motivate the use of surveillance cameras, they should consequently exhibit sig-
ni…cant bene…ts. This paper studies the e¤ects of surveillance cameras on unruly
spectator behavior inside soccer stadiums by exploiting a natural experiment from the
highest Swedish soccer league. The data on this type of behavior is …led by the referees
game by game in the time period 1999 to 2005.
The costs of policing soccer games are vast. In Sweden, the annual cost of policing
is approximately 7 500 000 euro (Dagens Nyheter, February 12, 2007). In the larger
league in Italy, Serie A, these costs amount to approximately 40 000 000 euro (De
Biasi 1997). It is important to study the e¤ects of surveillance cameras because if
they deter unruly behavior, then the use of cameras could potentially reduce these
costs. Moreover, even though the analysis focuses on unruly spectator behavior, it
may suggest how surveillance cameras a¤ect unruly behavior elsewhere in the society.
The Swedish stadiums have at various points in time installed surveillance cameras
at the grandstands. Only three stadiums had cameras in the 1990s. Due to a new
regulation from the Swedish Football Association, all stadiums hosting clubs in the
highest league had to have cameras installed either in 2000 or in 2001.
The dates at which cameras were introduced were to a large extent exogenous
to previous unruly behavior. According to a senior o¢cial at the Swedish Football
Association, the change in the policy was not that spectators were particularly unruly
during the previous seasons, but rather that the Swedish arena safety was lagging
2behind the safety norms issued by UEFA. Surveillance cameras have for example been
used in England since the 1980s (www.footballnetwork.org).1 Moreover, the dates for
the installation of cameras were not uniform but di¤ered across stadiums during the
years 2000 and 2001 due to administrative and budgetary reasons as well as to di¤erent
delays in the provision of the camera equipment.2 The administrative processing time
to issue permits to use cameras typically varied from 30 days to 90 days, and in one
case it was as high as 413 days.3
I use the di¤erent timing of the introduction of surveillance cameras inside the
stadiums to estimate their e¤ect on the number of incidents where objects, such as
coins, bottles, and lighters, were thrown onto the …eld by spectators. During the
soccer seasons 1999 to 2005, there were on average 0.26 incidents per game before the
cameras were installed. Conditioning on stadium …xed e¤ects, I …nd that games in
stadiums with surveillance cameras experienced approximately 65 percent less unruly
behavior inside the stadiums relative to before they were installed.
In the literature on police and crime it is often suggested that if crime is reduced
in one area, it may be displaced to other areas. It is however di¢cult to empirically
assess this hypothesis since crime can be displaced to many di¤erent locations. I am
able to address this issue, using unique data not only on unruly supporter behavior
inside stadiums, but also on unruly supporter behavior outside stadiums where the use
of surveillance cameras is not permitted. I …rst analyze a data set from the Swedish
National Police Force, which covers unruly behavior, such as spontaneous …ghting or
the throwing of missiles at other supporters or the police, outside the stadiums where
surveillance cameras are not permitted. I then use information on organized hooligan
…ghts in Sweden, reported by the violent organization “Firman Boys”, supporting the
Stockholm club AIK. The results show that the unruly supporter behavior that was
1According to the o¢cial, “it is likely that experiences from outside Sweden, in particular from
England, led to the decision to use surveillance cameras”.
2According to the employee responsible for the installations of the camera equipment, the working
load both of the …rms doing the cabel work and the …rm installing the cameras a¤ected the …nal
installation dates substantially.
3In addition, in contrast to other clubs, the Stockholm clubs did not get …nancial assistance from
the municipality, which delayed their applications for permits.
3reduced inside stadiums due to the surveillance cameras was not displaced to unruly
supporter behavior outside the stadiums.
There does to my knowledge not exist any work in the economics literature that
isolates the e¤ects of surveillance cameras on crime. But the paper is closely related
to a recent literature, which addresses the causal relationship between policing and
crime. Levitt (1997) uses gubernal elections as an instrument for policing and …nds that
policing tends to reduce crime.4 Using natural experiments, Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2004) and Klick and Tabarrok (2005) show that policing tends to reduce in particular
auto theft.5
The present analysis adds to this literature by addressing the e¤ects of surveillance
cameras rather than street police. In addition, while Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004)
use one policy intervention where the allocation of police changed, and Klick and
Tabarrok (2005) use four, in the natural experiment I exploit there are as many as
thirteen di¤erent policy interventions where stadiums introduced surveillance cameras
at di¤erent points in time.
There exists a relatively large criminology literature and a number of British gov-
ernment reports that study how surveillance cameras a¤ect street crime, burglary and
auto theft (see Welsh and Farrington 2002 and 2008 for detailed reviews). However,
this literature typically su¤ers either from the fact that the installation of surveillance
cameras was endogenous to previous crime6, or that several types of policing were
adopted at the same time, or both. Moreover, the cameras themselves may in addition
to in‡uencing the criminals also in‡uence the behavior of the potential victims of crime,
which makes it di¢cult to isolate their deterrent e¤ect.7 Finally, the simple fact that
4However, McCrary (2002) shows that after adjusting for a computational error (see also Levitt’s
reply, 2002) the results are not statistically signi…cant.
5Klick and Tabarrok (2005) make use of the fact that elevated terror-alert levels in Washington
led to a number of precautions made by the government, in particular an approximately 50-percent
increase in street police, but also to an activation of the closed-circuit camera system that covers
sensitive areas of their treatment group, the national mall. The isolated e¤ect of the cameras can
however not be analyzed.
6For example, if surveillance cameras are installed due to an increased level of crime, then individ-
uals potentially subjects to crime may change their behavior due to the elevated crime level rather
than to the cameras.
7Individuals could for example report more crime to encourage the use of cameras, or take more
4more crimes are spotted by the cameras also blurs their deterrent e¤ect.
Using unique data, I will be able to address these concerns. The endogeneity prob-
lem is by and large excluded, and, importantly, there were no other policy interventions
at the same time as the installation of the cameras in 2000 and 2001. The deterrent
e¤ect of the cameras can furthermore be isolated since the referees who …le the reports
on unruly behavior do not use information from the cameras. Also, in contrast to many
other types of crime, the victims of the type of unruly behavior I consider (players,
referees and other supporters) can hardly change their behavior due to the existence
of the cameras.
The outline is the following. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical strategy.
Section 3 shows the results. The displacement e¤ect is analyzed in Section 4 and Section
5 concludes.
2 Data
I use information on the use of closed circuit television surveillance system (surveillance
cameras) in the di¤erent soccer stadiums in the highest league Swedish soccer league,
“Allsvenskan”. Because Sweden hosted the European Championship in 1992, cameras
were installed in that year in several stadiums, but they were only continued to be used
in Nya Ullevi Stadium in Gothenburg and in Råsunda Stadium in Solna, Stockholm.
Apart from Olympia in the city Helsingborg, which had cameras installed before the
soccer season 1999, the other stadiums did not have surveillance cameras at work during
the 1990s. But before the season in the year 2000 a decision was taken by the Swedish
Football Association that surveillance cameras had to be installed within two years in
all stadiums where soccer in the highest league was played. A reason for this decision
was that Sweden was lagging behind the European safety standards in soccer stadiums
set by The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). According to o¢cials
at the Swedish football association, the change in policy regarding the cameras was in
any event not due to any previous change in unruly spectator behavior.
risks in response to the existence of cameras.
5Surveillance cameras were installed in the stadiums at di¤erent points in time dur-
ing 2000 and 2001 (or later if a newcomer entered the league). The timing of the
installations di¤ered for several reasons. Permits to use surveillance cameras are issued
by county administrative boards, and local administrative delays di¤ered across the
country. In addition, in contrast to municipalities outside Stockholm, the Stockholm
municipality did not …nancially assist the clubs when buying and installing the cameras,
which delayed the applications in Stockholm.8 Moreover, according to the employee
responsible for the installation of the cameras, delays in the provision of the cabel work
and the camera equipment a¤ected the dates of the installations in the various stadi-
ums. The permits are issued to the owner of the stadium, and the Swedish National
Police Force operates the cameras. Table 1 shows the processing time to get permits
for the various clubs, and the time at which surveillance cameras were installed. The
time varied from 30 days (Ryavallen, used by IF Elfsborg) to 413 days (Söderstadion,
used by Hammarby IF).9 The installation of the cameras took place in the time period
July 4, 2000 to April 4, 2001.
According to Swedish law, surveillance cameras must be indicated by clear signs.
In the arenas, this is publicly indicated with signs showing a picture of a surveillance
camera, typically placed at all entrances as well as inside the stadiums. The directives
from the Swedish Football Association regarding the position of the cameras are that
they “should be able to cover the whole arena”. The licenses do, however, not allow
any surveillance outside the stadiums.
I use the variation in the timing of the installation in surveillance cameras to analyze
how they a¤ect unruly spectator behavior. Spectators sometimes throw objects, such
as coins, bottles, lighters, …recrackers, batteries and snu¤ boxes, etc. According to the
head of the so called Sport Intelligence and Tactical Unit at the Swedish National Police
Force, these individuals are not necessarily violent hooligans that systematically …ght
8The information on surveillance cameras has been provided by the Swedish Football Association,
the head of the Sport Intelligence and Tactical Unit at the Swedish National Police Force in Stockholm,
the previous head of the arena security department of the club Hammarby IF, and the employee in
charge of the installations of the cameras at the …rm MKS Säkerhetsprodukter.
9It took much longer to issue the permit to Nya Ullevi in 1992 but this is outside the time period
I consider.
6each other but more “ordinary” supporters. It takes a fair amount of determination to
hit the pitch, and the aim is, presumably, to hit either players or referees. This is of
course unlawful behavior, which can be dangerous. There are two types of punishments
for unruly spectator behavior. In serious cases when somebody is hit by objects for
example, the case can go to court. In addition, the club may have to pay a …ne which
amounts to 10 000 to 250 000 Swedish crowns (11 000 to 27 000 Euro).
The referees report the number of incidents when objects are thrown onto the
…eld, and from which supporter section the objects came from, in their regular “game-
report”. I have access to information from these reports in the time period 1999 to 2005.
Out of the total 1273 games, 211 games were played without surveillance cameras.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics on unruly behavior. There were, on average,
0.26 incidents per game without surveillance cameras and 0.21 incidents per game with
cameras. As a robustness check, I also construct a variable which takes on one if there
were one or more incidents in a game and zero otherwise. There were incidents in 16
percent of the games with cameras and in 12 percent in games without cameras.
Figure 1 depicts changes in percent in the number of unruly incidents inside sta-
diums due to the introduction of surveillance cameras. It shows that nine stadiums
exhibited fewer incidents in the periods with surveillance cameras compared to with-
out. Eight of the reductions were very large, well over 50 percent. One stadium had
the same number of incidents per game with and without cameras, and one stadium in
fact experienced more incidents in the period with cameras.10 The stadiums Nya Ullevi
in Gothenburg, Råsundastadion outside Stockholm, and Olympia in Helsingborg, had
cameras before the season 1999 and serve as a control group.11 Taken together, they
10Because there were no incidents at all before the cameras were introduced in Norrportens Arena
(where IFK Sundsvall plays), and Vångavallen (where Trelleborgs FF plays), these observations cannot
be reported in the …gure. In the case of Norrportens Arena, this is partly due to the fact that there
were only …ve observations before the introduction of the cameras. There were however slight absolute
increases in unruly behavior in the periods when cameras were used (0.07 incidents per game in
Norrportens arena and 0.14 in Vångavallen).
11All Stockholm derbies between AIK, Djurgårdens IF (that normally plays at Stockholms Stadion)
and Hammarby IF (that normally plays at Söderstadion) have been taking place at Råsundastadion
where surveillance cameras were in use throughout the time period considered. These derbies are
therefore included in the control group.
7experienced a very small reduction in unruly behavior in the period with cameras.12
Figure 1. Changes in the Number of Incidents


















































To exclude the possibility that the reduction in the number of incidents did not
take place already before the installation of cameras, the analysis will be focused on
the number of incidents in the periods before and after the introduction of surveillance
cameras. In Figure 2, I collapse the number of incidents in two-week periods stadium
by stadium and depict …ve such periods before the installation of cameras and …fteen
periods after. In other words, the data is now normalized around the date of the
introduction of the cameras. There is a clear downward jump at the time of the
introduction of cameras. In the …ve two-round periods before the installation of cameras
there were, on average, 0.25 incidents per game. In the …fteen two-round periods after,
on the other hand, the average was 0.07 incidents per game. Hence, in this interval,
the reduction in the number of incidents amounts to 72 percent.13
12In order to illustrate the changes in the control group, an assumption has to be made regarding
the timing of the introduction of cameras. I take it to be that of the second largest stadium in the
city or region (July 4, 2000 for Nya Ullevi, August 18, 2000 for Råsundastadion, and April 4, 2001 for
Olympia).
13The …gure only includes stadiums that had games both with and without surveillance cameras.
8Figure 2. Incidents 10 Rounds Before
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To test if surveillance cameras a¤ect the extent to which spectators throw objects,
I use the following set up. Let Yij denote the number of incidents in stadium i in game
j. I will run the regression
Yij = ￿i + ￿cameraij + vij; (1)
where ￿i is a stadium …xed e¤ect.14 The parameter ￿ measures the e¤ect of having
cameras on the unruly behavior by spectators. In other words, I compare the behavior
of supporters in the same stadium in a game with cameras to a game without cameras.15
The full data set contains games from 1999 to 2005. One way of controlling for
time trends in the outcome variable is to use a full set of dummy variables for every
round. However, this will not be feasible in practice since the panel data set consist
of only 13 cross-sectional units but there are 182 rounds. I instead control for time
trends with monthly …xed e¤ects because there may be seasonal variation in unruly
spectator behavior. It is for example possible that it is increased in the beginning and
Kalmar FF played in the highest league without cameras in 1999 and then again in 2002 with cameras.
Due to the large time di¤erence, Kalmar FF is not included in the …gure. Including this club does
however not a¤ect the results substantially.
14As mentioned above, Djurgårdens IF and Hammarby IF have played their derby home games
against each other and against AIK at Råsundastadion. I treat Djurgården’s and Hammarby’s home
games at Råsunda separately and di¤erently from when they play in there normal home stadiums
(Stockholms Stadion and Söderstadion). The results are however not sensitive to this assumption.
15I use OLS speci…cations. The results are also robust to the use of Probit or Poisson speci…cations.
9in the end of the soccer seasons. Thus, since the season begins in April and ends in
November, I will add nine indicator variables for the month in which the game took
place. Another possibility is that there are stadium-speci…c trends, which I also will
control for. The most convincing method is perhaps to reduce the sample size and focus
on what happened in the short periods before and after the introduction of cameras at
the di¤erent stadiums. Because the introduction of the cameras took place at di¤erent
points in time, in a su¢ciently short time interval trends cannot be important for the
results. I therefore focus on this method in the subsequent regressions. I will …rst
include games one year before and one year after the introduction of cameras. Each
team plays 13 games in a year.16 I then use a sample with six games before and six
games after the introduction of cameras, which is followed by four games before and
after. I …nally include only two games before and after the introduction of cameras.
3 Results
Table 3 and Table 4 report the main results. Column 1 in Table 3 shows the results for
the full sample (1999 to 2005) using only stadium …xed e¤ects. The estimated e¤ect
is that games with cameras had 0.16 fewer incidents than games without cameras.
This amounts to a 64 percent reduction compared to the average number of incidents
without cameras, 0.26. In column 2 I add month …xed e¤ects. The estimated e¤ect
and the standard error remains almost the same. In column 3 I add stadium speci…c
linear trends. The coe¢cient is if anything increased and the signi…cance remains the
same. In Table 4, the sample size is reduced to focus on the e¤ects in the time periods
close to the introduction of the cameras. As expected, when the sample size is reduced,
the precision in the estimates is also somewhat reduced. Importantly, the estimated
e¤ect of the variable “surveillance cameras” remains strikingly similar independently
of the sample size. It ‡uctuates between 0.16 and 0.21. When using a larger sample
size, a potential concern is that trends might bias the results. But since the coe¢cient
16For some stadiums, which are included in the regressions, there are less than 13 observations
before the cameras were introduced.
10remains almost identical, this does not seem to in‡uence the results. The analysis
therefore strongly suggests that the introduction of cameras reduced unruly behavior
inside the stadiums.
As the number of incidents per game varies, I next check that not a few games with
many incidents drive the results. The dependent variable now takes on 1 if there was
one or more incidents in a game and 0 otherwise. Table 5 shows the results for the
full sample. Column 1 shows that the number of games with incidents was 9 percent
lower in games with cameras compared to games without cameras. This amounts to
a 56-percent reduction since there, on average, were incidents in 16 percent of the
games without cameras. The result is signi…cant at the 5 percent level. Column 2 adds
month-…xed e¤ects and the estimated e¤ect is the same. The signi…cance remains high
also when adding a stadium speci…c linear trend in Column 3. Table 6 shows that the
estimated e¤ect is similar when reducing the sample size. If anything, it is larger in
the interval close to the introduction of the cameras. The results are signi…cant in all
speci…cations.
A concern with these OLS regressions is that because of potential serial correlation,
they may underestimate the standard errors. As a robustness test, I therefore collapse
the whole data set for each stadium into two observations, one before the introduction
of cameras, and one after. Table 7 reports the results. The estimated e¤ect is similar
to before, -0.18, and the signi…cance remains high.
It is possible that more spectators come to the soccer games due to the cameras if
they feel safer, and this could change the total amount of unruly behavior. When the
composition of the spectators change, a nicer atmosphere could for example arise, which
would reduce the total number of incidents. To control for this, I use total number of
incidents per game and per spectator (multiplied by 1000) as the dependent variable.
The average for this dependent variable in games without cameras is 0.04. Column 1 in
Table 8 shows that the use of cameras reduces the number of incidents per spectators
by 75 percent. While the standard error is reduced somewhat when the sample size is
reduced, the estimated e¤ect is very similar.
11A potential problem when studying surveillance cameras and crime, and police and
crime in general, is that many interventions are often made at the same time. If the
number of police o¢cers is increased at the same time as cameras are installed, then
only the joint e¤ect can be estimated. On the other hand, less police may also be
ordered in consequence to the installation of the cameras since the two types of law
enforcements may be complements. In my contact with police sources, I have found no
evidence that the number of police o¢cers at the games was changed around the time
when the surveillance cameras were installed. Nevertheless, I will perform a placebo
treatment to study if the number of police o¢cers at the games were di¤erent in the
games with cameras compared to the games without.
The data on the number of police o¢cers at the games is obtained from the Swedish
National Police Force. On average, there were 19 police o¢cers per game without
cameras, and 25 police o¢cers per game with cameras. Table 9 shows how the use of
cameras is related to the number of police o¢cers. The Table shows that there is no
signi…cant di¤erence in the number of police o¢cers before and after the installation
of surveillance cameras. This reinforces the information from the police force, that the
number of police o¢cers working with unruly spectator behavior has not been related
to the use of surveillance cameras. The reduction in unruly behavior can therefore fully
be derived from the use of cameras.
In sum, all speci…cations point in the same way, namely that the introduction of
surveillance cameras in the soccer stadiums had a very large deterrent impact on unruly
supporter behavior.
4 Displacement E¤ects
A classical problem in the literature on crime is that when unruly behavior in one place
is reduced, it may be displaced elsewhere. It is however di¢cult to address this issue
empirically because crime may be displaced to so many locations. I have access to
unique data on unruly behavior outside stadiums, which I will use to study this e¤ect.
If incidents are reduced inside the stadium, then the displacement theory predicts that
12there would be more incidents outside the stadiums where cameras are not permitted.
I …rst use information from the Swedish National Police Force on disturbances outside
the stadiums. The police data captures …ghts or throwing of stones or bottles between
supporters of di¤erent teams or against the police. The location is often immediately
outside the stadium and sometimes in the town where the game is played. Importantly,
the cameras are permitted inside the stadiums only and can therefore not a¤ect this
unruly behavior directly.
I also make use of self-reported data on organized violence reported by the violent
hooligan organization “Firman Boys”, which supports the club AIK17. It contains very
detailed information on every larger hooligan incident in Sweden since 1992. Organized
hooliganism takes place between two groups supporting di¤erent sports teams. They
call each other in advance to set the stage for the …ght. The …ghts typically take place
on the game day. The individuals that engage in organized violence are, according to
the head of the Sport Intelligence and Tactical Unit at the Swedish National Police
Force, not necessarily the same individuals as those who throw missiles inside the
stadiums. But to the extent they are the same individuals, it is possible that they
displace their unruly behavior.
Table 10 shows the summary statistics for the two variables for the periods before
and after the introduction of cameras. The dependent variable “Disorder outside the
stadiums” takes on 1 if a disorder has occurred and 0 otherwise. There were on average
0.08 incidents before the introduction of cameras and 0.10 incidents per game after.
Similarly, the variable “Organized hooliganism” takes on 1 if violence has occurred and
0 otherwise. There were 0.04 such incidents per game before the introduction of the
cameras and 0.08 incidents after.
To study if there were any changes in unruly supporter behavior before and after
cameras were introduced inside the stadiums I estimate equation 1 …rst with disorder
outside stadiums as the dependent variable and then with organized hooliganism as the
dependent variable. Table 11 shows the results when the dependent variable is disorder
17See www.sverigescenen.com.
13outside the stadium. I …rst use the full sample and then a smaller sample containing
games from one year before and one year after the introduction of cameras.18 Column
1 shows that unruly behavior outside stadiums was not signi…cantly di¤erent in games
with cameras compared to in games without cameras. Column 2 con…rms this when the
smaller sample is used. Table 12 shows a similar pattern for hooligan violence. There
was no signi…cant di¤erence in this type of violence in games with cameras compared
to in games without cameras.19 This result remains independently of the sample size
used.
In sum, the data strongly suggests that the unruly behavior inside the stadiums
that was reduced after the introduction of the cameras was not displaced to unruly
supporter behavior outside the stadiums.
5 Concluding Remarks
The use of surveillance cameras has become a widespread method to reduce crime.
However, intrusion upon privacy is a serious concern, and it is therefore important to
carefully evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the cameras. But the study of their deterrent
e¤ects is associated with a number of deep problems. Cameras are for example often
adopted when crime is particularly severe, and together with other measures. The
deterrent e¤ects are furthermore blurred by the fact that cameras may a¤ect the pre-
cautions taken by potential victims of crime, and also change the intensity by which
they report crime. In addition, whenever cameras are used to detect crime, their de-
terrent e¤ect is blurred.
This paper uses a natural experiment and unique data on unruly spectator behavior
to address these concerns. I have argued that the timing of the introduction of the
cameras was to a large extent exogenous to previous unruly behavior. There were no
other policy interventions at the same time as the introduction of the cameras. In
18The police have not reported information from the year 2000. Since most observations would be
missing, it is not sensible to use smaller windows around the time of the introduction of cameras.
19The results do not change if controlling for month …xed e¤ects or linear trends.
14addition, the referees …ling the reports on unruly behavior did not take information
from the cameras into account. This way I am able to isolate the e¤ect of surveillance
cameras on unruly spectator behavior.
The results show that there was much less unruly behavior inside stadiums when
surveillance cameras were used compared to the games when they were not used. The
various speci…cations reveal that the reduction was at least 65 percent. I have also
shown that the unruly behavior inside stadiums was not displaced to unruly behavior
outside stadiums or to organized hooligan violence.
The results of the analysis show that unruly spectators are deterred by surveillance
cameras to a large extent, which suggests that, at least in soccer stadiums, the bene…ts
of using cameras may dominate the costs in terms of intrusion upon privacy and man-
agement. It is tempting to extrapolate these …ndings to other types of unruly behavior,
such as for example crimes on the streets, in subways, schools, shops, or in apartment
complexes. My view is that this may well be at least in parts possible. However, ad-
ditional empirical research, which addresses the particular problems mentioned above,
would certainly help policy makers to evaluate whether the potential positive e¤ects of
the cameras dominate the costs.
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16                                           TABLE 1. THE INTRODUCTION OF SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS
Name of stadium Home club Applied Accepted Processing time (days) Installed
Råsundastadion AIK August 17, 1987 October 12, 1987 57 1987
Nya Ullevi Göteborg January 25, 1989 January 25, 1991 730 1991
Olympia Helsingborg June 8, 1998 July 7, 1998 30 April 9, 1999
Gamla Ullevi Örgryte, GAIS November 7, 1999 February 7, 2000 90 July 4, 2000
Örjans Vall Halmstad June 20, 2000 July 20, 2000 31 July 13, 2000
Idrottsparken Sundsvall Sundsvall Feb 25, 2000 April 27, 2000 62 July 13, 2000
Ruddalens IP Västra Frölunda February 10, 2000 March 21, 2000 41 July 14, 2000
Rambergsvallen Häcken February 5, 2000 March 21, 2000 46 July 14, 2000
Parken Norrköping March 12, 2001 Maj 3, 2001 52 July 19, 2000
Eyravallen Örebro August 8, 2000 September 12, 2000 35 July 21, 2000
Stockholms Stadion Djurgården March 12, 2001 June 6, 2001 85 August 18, 2000
Ryavallen Elfsborg April 8, 2000 May 8, 2000 30 September 7, 2000
Vångavallen Trelleborg June 13, 2000 August 23, 2000 71 October 9, 2000
Söderstadion Hammarby February 22, 2000 April 11, 2001 413 October 13, 2000
Malmö Stadion Malmö January 18, 2001 March 09, 2001 49 April 4, 2001
                                                              TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INCIDENTS INSIDE STADIUMS
Mean  St. Dev. Min Max Obs
Before camera Total number of incidents per game 0.26 0.72 0 4 211
Games with incidents = 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 211
After camera Total number of incidents per game 0.21 0.68 0 5 1062
Games with incidents = 1 0.12 0.32 0 1 1062
17                       TABLE 3. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND
                        UNRULY BEHAVIOR INSIDE STADIUMS
Dependent variable:  Number of incidents with objects thrown onto field
Sample [1] [2] [3]
Surveillance cameras -0.16** -0.16** -0.27**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Linear stadium specific trend No No Yes
R
2 0.11 0.11 0.13
Observations 1273 1273 1273
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and
* at the 1 percent level. The full data set (1999-2005) is used. The regressions include
stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the level of the stadiums.
             TABLE 4. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND UNRULY BEHAVIOR
                            INSIDE STADIUMS, REDUCED SAMPLE SIZE
Dependent variable:  Number of incidents with objects thrown onto field
Sample One year Six rounds Four rounds Two rounds
Surveillance cameras -0.21** -0.16** -0.20 -0.21
(0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.17)
R
2 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.3
Observations 354 165 112 56
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 1 percent level.
The regressions include stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the level of
the stadiums.
18                       TABLE 5. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND
                     UNRULY BEHAVIOR INSIDE STADIUMS (0,1)
Dependent variable:  Games with objects thrown onto field (0,1)
Sample [1] [2] [3]
Surveillance cameras -0.09** -0.08** -0.14**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Month fixed effects No Yes Yes
Linear stadium specific trend No No Yes
R
2 0.09 0.09 0.13
Observations 1273 1273 1273
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and
* at the 1 percent level. The full data set (1999-2005) is used. The regressions include
stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the level of the stadiums.
             TABLE 6. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND UNRULY BEHAVIOR
                         INSIDE STADIUMS, REDUCED SAMPLE SIZE (0,1)
Dependent variable:  Games with objects thrown onto field (0,1)
Sample One year Six rounds Four rounds Two rounds
Surveillance cameras -0.12** -0.10** -0.14** -0.18*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
R
2 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.38
Observations 354 165 112 56
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 1 percent level.
The regressions include stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the level of
the stadiums.
19  TABLE 7. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND UNRULY BEHAVIOR
                      INSIDE THE STADIUMS, COLLAPSED DATA







Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and
* at the 1 percent level. The regression includes stadium fixed effects and the standard
errors are clustered at the level of the stadiums.
          TABLE 8. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND UNRULY BEHAVIOR
                        BEHAVIOR PER SPECTATOR INSIDE STADIUMS
Dependent variable:  Number of incidents with objects thrown onto field
Sample Full data set One year Six rounds Four rounds Two rounds
Surveillance cameras -0.03** -0.04** -0.03* -0.04** -0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
R
2 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.28
Observations 1272 354 165 112 56
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 1 percent
level. The regressions include stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the
the level of the stadiums.  The first regression includes month fixed effects and stadium specific
linear trends.
20                        TABLE 9. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND
                            THE NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS
Dependent variable:  Surveillance cameras (0,1)
Sample Full data set One year





Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and
* at the 1 percent level. The regressions include stadium fixed effects
and the standard errors are clustered at the level of the stadiums.
                      TABLE 10. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DISPLACEMENT EFFECT
Mean St.Dev. Min Max Observations
Before camera Disorder outside stadiums 0.08 0.27 0 1 116
Organized hooliganism 0.04 0.20 0 1 212
After camera Disorder outside stadiums 0.10 0.3 0 1 744
Organized hooliganism 0.08 0.27 0 1 1061
21                         TABLE 11. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND
                         UNRULY BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE STADIUMS
Dependent variable:  Disorder outside the stadium (0,1)
Sample Full data set One year





Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and
* at the 1 percent level. The regressions include stadium fixed effects
and the standard errors are clustered at the level of the stadiums.
                                         TABLE 12. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS AND
                                           ORGANIZED HOOLIGAN VIOLENCE
Dependent variable:  Organized hooligan violence (0,1)
Sample Full data set One year Six rounds Four rounds Two rounds
Surveillance cameras -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
R
2 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.21
Observations 1273 354 165 112 56
Note: *** indicates signficance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 1 percent level.
The regressions include stadium fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at the level of
the stadiums.
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